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Can a scientist trust that the government is going to pay him or her
fairly? In the science–government relationship, an incumbent may be
better off if he or she does not provide—or does not provide a fair pay
to public scientists. We propose a simple game-theoretic model for
understanding the trust problem in the relationship between governments
and scientists. The model shows how with reliable governments
(democracies), bureaucratic contracts (e.g., secure tenure) are not
optimal since they have low-powered incentives (in contrast to the high-
powered private-sector type of contracts) and run against scientists’
responsiveness to government demands. However, with nonreliable
governments (dictatorships), bureaucratic contracts are second-best
solutions because they protect scientists against the possibility of
governments’ misbehavior (i.e., ex post opportunistic defections, such as
canceling research programs overnight). An empirical analysis confirms
the predictions: bureaucratic contracts enhance scientific productivity
with nonreliable governments (dictatorships) but hamper scientific
productivity with reliable governments (democracies).
Can a scientist trust that the government is going to pay him or her
fairly? Fairness is important for a scientist who undertakes a costly
asset-specific investment before his or her research is completed,
evaluated, and paid for. A wrong evaluation or misconduct by the payer
is a risk a researcher has to consider before engaging in a long, difficult
career. Usually, the political concern is the opposite: can the
government trust that the scientist would not take advantage of the
obscurity of his or her subject to conceal the research he or she is really
doing or its quality? Most work on the subject has focused on this
particular problem: the moral hazard of the agent (i.e., the state
scientist). In this article, we explore the other point of view: the moral
hazard of the principal (i.e., the government). We contend that the
Politics & Policy, Volume 36, No. 6 (2008): 1006-1043. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
© The Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.
relationship between powerful governments and scientists is subject
to problems of credibility similar to the ones described in the
interaction between, for instance, powerful governments and bankers
(North and Weingast 1989) or between powerful governments and
interest groups (Horn 1995; Moe 1984, 1990). The reason is that, once
scientists have undertaken costly asset-specific investments in a given
research, they are in a weak situation vis-à-vis the government, which
may take opportunistic advantages such as not rewarding them
properly.1
As most scholars point out, when dealing with bankers or with
interest groups, powerful governments tend to create institutional
devices throughwhich they tie their hands to solve their lackof credibility
(Kydland and Prescott 1977). Like Ulysses bound to the mast, by
accepting limitations on its own caprice, a government can increase its
capacity to achieve its ends (Holmes 1988). These limitations often take
the form of bureaucratic rules that reduce governmental discretion for
controlling thepublic administration (Horn1995;Moe1990;Williamson
1999). Civil service arrangements, which grant public employees
autonomy from political interferences in staff policy, are a known
example of those bureaucratic rules (Frant 1993).Nevertheless, although
the literature agrees that institutions matter for policy outcomes, it is not
clear what the particular effects of bureaucratic rules are. While some
authors argue that bureaucratic rules are efficiency enhancing (Rauch
1995), others claim that they are efficiency decreasing (Moe andCaldwell
1994). In particular, in science policy studies, we lack both theoretical
models and comparative empirical evidence to contrast the different
impact of bureaucratic rules on scientific productivity. To start with,
Science and Technology policy is still an under-theorized field (Guston
1996; Sapolski 1975) without clear predictions on which factors lead to
more bureaucratic rules in the relationship between governments and
scientists.
This article argues that, in the case of state scientists, the effects
of bureaucratic rules depend on the type of political regime a country
has. A simple game-theoretic model and a subsequent empirical
comparison show how bureaucratic rules produce better science in
dictatorships but worse science in democracies. In a dictatorship,
bureaucratic rules are a solution to the credible commitment problem
created by the ruler who does not face constraints to his or her
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potential opportunistic behavior regarding science policy. In a
dictatorship, the benefits of bureaucratization (i.e., tying ruler’s
opportunistic hands) are higher than its costs (i.e., lack of flexibility).
In a democracy, on the contrary, the problem of credible commitment
is less acute because rulers are constrained by checks and balances
that prevent them from undertaking opportunistic actions against
scientists—as a result, bureaucratic arrangements are less useful. In a
democracy, the costs of bureaucratic rules would thus be higher than
their limited benefits.
This study aims at answering why governments tie their hands in
the management of scientists through bureaucratic rules and what the
effects of those bureaucratic rules over scientific productivity are. We
address these research questions by exploring the impact of regime
type over scientists and making use of principal–agent theory (PAT)
as an appropriate method. The main contribution is theoretical,
bringing the three elements together (regime type, administration
type, and policy outcomes) in a simple explanation, inspired by
simple game theory, that produces falsifiable propositions. The
article first joins the principal–agent and political regime literatures
for the study of Science and Technology and, second, shifts the
analytical focus within PAT to the trustworthiness of the principal.
The theoretical hypotheses are subject afterward to a preliminary
empirical assessment using some of the few existing data sets on the
issue as well as some examples to illuminate the workings of the
theory.
The article begins by explaining why PAT offers a suitable
framework to model the relationship between governments and
scientists. It then focuses on the dimension of principal–agent
relations—the problem of time inconsistency—that is, key to
explaining differences in the institutional devices that link a
government with its scientists. We then develop a game-theoretic
model based on time-inconsistency problems, which endogeneizes
the government’s decision over the type of contract (more/less
“bureaucratized”) with scientists. It also predicts a country’s level
of science production as a function of the political regime and the
degree of scientists’ bureaucratization. The study finally offers
evidence of the theoretical hypotheses for dictatorships and
democracies, respectively.
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Why a Principal–Agent Model?
In popular accounts of science, scientists are often portrayed as
selfless individuals, working for humankind. Earlier sociological
explanations argued that extrinsic rewards, such as position and money,
play a minor role in science (Hagstrom 1965, 19). Here, however, we
assume that scientists are self-interested.2 For simplicity, we assume that
position, money, and direct rewards are instrumental goods even for
selfless actors, which allows us to treat scientists as agents of the
government (here the principal). The article, thus, relies on PAT and
takes a contractual approach toward explaining public science
organizations and hierarchies.3
A growing strand of literature in science policy (see e.g., Braun 1993;
Caswill 1998; Guston 1996; Morris 2003; Van der Meulen 1998) has
adopted the PATperspective in the followingway: a government requests
the scientists to perform certain tasks that the principal is not able to
perform directly (Guston 1996, 230, our emphasis). The key question is
“how do nonscientists get scientists to do what we all, as citizens, have
decided?” (229), and the key variable is the information asymmetry
between the two main actors. We depart from this literature in three
different ways. First, we focus on the simplest model—with the
government as the principal and the scientists as the agents—ignoring
intermediate actors.4 In doing so, we are making a rough simplification,
but our aim is to analyze the interplay between the two essential actors in
science: those who ultimately manage science policy and those who
ultimately do science. Second, we use a one-shot game without
repetition.5 Third, our model focuses on the possibility of principal’s
misbehavior.
The problem traditionally addressed by PAT is the design of a
contract to limit the agent’s misconduct—the well-known issues of
moral hazard and adverse selection (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). The
agent is seen as the main source of problems, while the problems created
by principals, such as the possibility of not rewarding the agent
properly, have been overlooked. Yet principals’ misconduct must also
be taken into account, especially in the public realm where the principal
(e.g., government) has a political nature and is thus more powerful
than the standard private-sector principal (e.g., manager). As Moe
(1990) has emphasized, PATs—primarily developed for understanding
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firms—assume the enforcement of contracts by a third party, but
problems may arise when one of the parties happens to be that third
party at the same time (i.e., the government).
Governments can renege on their pacts by, for example, unilaterally
changing the terms of those pacts through new ad hoc regulations. PAT
models applied to politics often overlook the full consequences of
the exercise of “public authority” (Moe 1990) or “political power”
(Moe 2005). Governments have extraordinary and, to a certain extent,
unpredictable powers: governments at time t cannot bind those at
time t + 1, and the incentives to renege are often substantial (Moe 1990,
220). Once agreements are struck, there is no external enforcement
mechanism to police them when one of the parties is the government.
Following Moe (1990, 213), the goal of our theory is to include this
“neglected side of the story” of PAT in the analysis of science policy.
Time-Inconsistency Problems
Once upon a time, on the banks of a great river lay a town called
Hamelin. One day, an extraordinary thing happened to disturb
the peace: a black sea of rats swarmed over the whole town. The
terrified citizens flocked to plead with the town councilors to free
them from the plague of rats. Just then, a stranger proposed to the
city council: “for a thousand florins, I’ll rid you of your rats!”
“A thousand florins!” exclaimed the Mayor. “We’ll give you fifty
thousand if you succeed!” Next day, by the time the sun was high,
there was not a single rat in the town. There was even greater
delight at the town hall, until the piper tried to claim his payment.
“Fifty thousand florins?” exclaimed the councilors, “Never!” “A
thousand florins at least,” cried the pied piper angrily. But the
Mayor broke in. “The rats are all dead now and they can never
come back. So be grateful for fifty florins, or you’ll not get even
that.”
Written by economists, the plot of this traditional tale could have
been different: the pied piper would have rationally anticipated that,
once the town was free of rats, it would no longer be in the interest of the
Mayor to reward him properly. Ex post, it would be more rational for
the Mayor to use the 50,000 florins to build a hospital in a swing district
or divert them directly to his own pockets. Therefore, the piper would
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probably have stayed at home and the story ends right at the beginning.
The tale of the pied piper illustrates nicely the problem of time-
inconsistent preferences that is inherent to politics.
In fact, the tale has been used to show the problems of credibility
for “committing against opportunistic behavior” that arise in the
relationship between governments and citizens (Sala-i-Martin 2004).
Ironically, it has not been used to shed light on the relationship between
real-world mayors (governments) and real-world pied pipers (public
employees). For instance, North and Weingast (1989) analyze the time-
inconsistency problem inherent to the relation between rulers and
bankers. They show that the more likely, it is that the sovereign will
alter property rights for his or her own benefit, the lower the expected
returns from investment and the lower, in turn, the incentives to invest
that economic agents have. We contend that if this time-inconsistency
problem arises in the relationship between a ruler and the people who
sometimes invest in the relationship with her (e.g., bankers who invest
their capital), it is even more likely to happen in the relationship
between a ruler and the people who normally invest in the relationship
with her (e.g., public employees who invest their human capital).
The pied piper’s dilemma has an obvious solution in polities with
rule of law and an independent third party capable of enforcing
contracts between public authorities and private agents. In that case,
the mayor and the piper could have signed a contract specifying the
details of the transaction. However, and this is the starting point of the
theoretical model described here, not all transactions can be
established in a formal contract, as developments in organizational
theory have been increasingly emphasizing. For example, Miller (1992)
considers that the relation between employers and employees is similar
to the “commitment problem” game developed by Kreps (1990). In
Miller’s adaptation of the game (see Figure 1), the employee moves
first and has a choice of trusting the superior (working hard) or not
trusting the superior (making a minimum effort). If the employee
trusts the superior, the latter has a choice of honoring trust and giving
a proper reward such as paying $10 per each piece the employee
produces, granting a promotion, not discounting work contracts in
difficult times, or the superior can violate trust by, for instance, cutting
the piece rate to $5 once he realizes how many pieces the employee is
able to make, canceling a scheduled promotion, or laying off excess
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employees in times of crisis. In this movement, the employer tends to
have incentives to violate trust because he frequently obtains a direct
benefit from that violation and this would leave the subordinate worse
off than if he failed to trust the superior. Anticipating this violation of
trust, the employee frequently refuses to trust the employer, which
results in an outcome of minimum effort—a Pareto-suboptimal Nash
Equilibrium.6
The Credible Commitment Game between Government and Scientists
The interaction between government and scientists can be modeled
by a two-person game like the one shown in Figure 2. A strong
Figure 1.
The Commitment Problem
Violate Trust
Employer
Honor TrustEMPLOYEE
Trust
Mistrust 
Employee
EMPLOYER
C
A B
B C
A
Sources: Employer’s outcome ranking A > B > C. Employee’s outcome
ranking A > B > C Mistrust (payoffs B and C represents a Pareto-suboptimal
Nash equilibrium. (Figure adapted from Miller 1992.)
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simplification is made here: several government politicians from several
departments are reduced to a single actor—the government—and,
therefore, we are ignoring their internal collective action problems.
Similarly, thousands of scientists are reduced to another single actor—
the scientist. All intermediate layers of the research hierarchy in a
country and all the separate institutions that mediate among actors
(research councils, universities) are outside the scope of this analysis.
Although a more comprehensive and realistic approach would require
including some of those actors in a more complex setting, the game
Figure 2.
The Positive Control Game
Violate Trust
Scientist
Honor TrustSCIENTIST
Maximum 
effort (Trust) 
Minimum 
effort 
(Mistrust) 
Government 
GOVERNMENT
A - d
B A
C B
C
GOVERNMENT
B - x B
Discretion 
Bureaucratization
Notes: Scientist’s outcome ranking A > B > C. Governments’ outcome
ranking A > B > C.
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representation used here is a heuristic device to depict an essential
feature of the relationship, similar to what Miller (1992) or Abraham
and Prosch (2000) do for the employer–employee interaction.
The game is similar to Miller’s trust game between an employer and
an employee depicted above, but now, the government (the employer)
has the choice of playing the trust game—retaining its discretion in the
management of scientists—or not playing it and “tying its hands” in
the management of scientists through a process of bureaucratization.
The term “bureaucratization” in this paper refers to the standard
definition of bureaucratic rules used by economists (Tirole 1994).
Bureaucratization is thus the limits to government’s discretion in its
relationships with state employees—in this case, scientists. With
bureaucratization, a government constrains ex ante its power to hire, fire,
promote, and fix incentives to scientists. Governments may tie their
hands in the management of scientists in two main ways. First,
bureaucratization can be implemented through delegating staff policy
to a politically autonomous institution such as a corps of university
professors (or other type of scientists), as is the case in countries like
France or Spain. Governments are not free to select, promote, fire, or
introducemonetary incentives to those scientists grouped in autonomous
corps. Second, bureaucratization may also involve the enactment of
laws and statutes through which governments limit their future actions
in the relationship with scientists. For example, when governments issue
rules that guarantee secure tenure or automatic promotion as a function
of seniority, governments are reducing their discretion in personnel
management.
Bureaucratization gives predictability to actors’ payoffs. The
assumption behind is that, instead of confronting unpredictable rewards
and incentives from political governments, scientists will deal with
predictable rules about rewards and punishments—rules enforced by
relatively autonomous bodies such as university councils or
administrative corps of scientists. Another feature of bureaucratized
institutions is that the incentive structure is low powered. Since, in
principle, there are more subordinates than superiors within
organizations, there are almost always several candidates for a
promotion in any kind of organization.
The idea is that in a bureaucratized organization, you must more
closely follow a step-by-step promotion system from one level to the one
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right above it. Without bureaucratic rules, the government could
promote any scientist to whatever position. Instead of the high-powered
(although less credible) incentives from governments, with
bureaucratization, scientists have low-powered incentives (although
more credible because they aremade by nonpolitical peers), whichwill be
clearly issued in statutes and regulations. With bureaucratization,
scientists will not obtain the maximum payoff (A) because governments
will not be able to offer them high monetary rewards or promotions
to the top levels of administration in exchange for maximum efforts.
At the same time, bureaucratization also prevents the worst outcome
for scientists (C) because they are less exposed to government’s
opportunistic actions. As a result, bureaucratization induces scientists to
exert a medium effort, halfway between the maximum and the minimum
effort. Scientists will exert a higher research effort than theminimumone
because they know that if they do so, they will receive some reward, like
a slow promotion; however, they put less effort in than they would have
had they expected high-powered rewards from the government.
Conversely, when they decide to grant bureaucratic autonomy,
governments do not enjoy the benefits of a high-powered system of
incentives (they only obtain a medium effort), but they also avoid the
worst payoff (C) (Kydland and Prescott 1977, 473). Unlike what
happens to public employees, governments face a cost (-x) for using
bureaucratization: they must pay employees for life, and they lose the
flexibility to respond to external shocks that demand fast changes to
the size and the composition of the civil service. Bureaucratization,
thus, plays the role that Falaschetti (2002, 165) attributes to hand-tying
institutions: mechanisms that cannot totally eliminate principals’ moral
hazard but that increase the cost of acting opportunistically. In general,
bureaucratization prevents best and worst outcomes for both players,
and it can be seen as a second-best option that is preferred when the best
solution involves too many risks for the actors.
The payoff structure of the game can be illustrated with the example
of the German scientific developments in the 1930s. Before the Nazi
regime came to power, there was a high level of bureaucratization
among scientists. German universities were state institutions and all
faculty members were subject to a bureaucratized career civil service
(Beyerchen 1977). Moreover, there exists a wide consensus that the
German government obtained relatively good scientific returns as a
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result. On the contrary, when the Nazis came into power, they adopted
a highly discretional approach to science, overturning many of the
existing bureaucratic rules.7
In terms of the model depicted here, the Nazi regime moved from
the predictable lower branch of the tree (bureaucratization) to the more
unpredictable higher branch (discretion). This implies that, sometimes,
the Nazis could achieve extraordinary results: scientists loyal to the
party, or those who believed they would be properly rewarded, were
ready to exert “maximum effort” in their research. The Nazis’ great
scientific and technological achievements in weaponry are an example
(Wintrobe and Breton 1986).8 Yet the Nazi government was not able
to obtain maximum efforts from the bulk majority of scientists. Apart
from the fact that many scientists were either purged or forced into
exile, most of those who remained at their positions opted for a
“minimum effort” strategy, taking advantage of their informational
advantages. Despite close monitoring, the Nazis did not know for sure
which type of scientific breakthrough those scientists could make.
The story of Curt Herzstark, inventor of the first pocket calculator,
represents an extreme example of the unpredictability of the Nazi’s
strictly controlled science (see Stoll 2004). Thanks to his informational
advantages, Curt Herzstark did not want to exert maximum effort to
develop a tool that could be nationalized by the Nazi regime—and
without a significant chance of obtaining a proper reward, especially
because he was Jewish. However, while he was imprisoned in the
Buchenwald concentration camp, an old competitor and colleague
recognized him and informed the camp commander that Herzstark
had previously been working on the development of a revolutionarily
small calculator. Soon, using his high discretion, a Nazi official took
Herzstark aside: “I understand you’ve been working on a new thing, a
small calculating machine . . . We will allow you to make and draw
everything. If it really functions, we will give it to the Führer as a present
after we win the war. Then, surely, you will be made an Aryan” (Stoll
2004, 86). Herzstark was conscious that “if I can make this calculator,
I can extend my life. Right there I started to draw the calculator, the
way I had imagined it” (86). By chance, the Nazis had overcome the
information asymmetry problem with one scientist: they knew quite
precisely which type of discovery Curt could make, and they were ready
to pass him through their powerful incentive system.
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Herzstark understood that if he could develop the calculator, he
would extend his life by at least some months; otherwise, his fate would
be the same as the rest of the prisoners. He was allowed to spend his
spare time working on the calculator, later called Curta. He worked
much harder than he would have under a system of bureaucratic
incentives, and he could have produced the highest payoff (A) for the
Nazi officials if the Allies had not freed the camp before the invention
was completed. This example illustrates, with one of the most extreme
cases one can think of, how difficult it is for highly authoritarian
regimes to induce scientists to undertake “maximum efforts,” unless
they are ideologically committed to the dictator. Given the highly
discretionary behavior of autocratic authorities, Herzstark-like
scientists will only exert maximum research efforts if, by chance,
authorities are able to overcome the information asymmetry problem
and know more-or-less precisely what a given scientist can achieve. It is
thus likely that many other Curta-like breakthrough inventions and
discoveries remained under-researched in Nazi Germany.
The scientist can make a maximum effort (trust) or a minimum
effort (mistrust), but what does “maximum effort” mean? We refer
here to two types of research work that are potentially subject to
governments’ time-inconsistency problems. First, “maximum effort”
would be to work hard and overtime in research tasks, similar to what
Curt Herzstark did. Second, “maximum effort” may also involve
undertaking asset-specific investments—an effort that is intrinsic to
science. Once the asset-specific investment has been made, the scientist
is in a weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis the government, and the
latter may abuse its position of power. On the contrary, “minimum
effort,” similar to Miller’s (1992) version of the game, would mean
maintaining a level of effort enough to avoid being fired.
If the scientist exerts maximum effort, the government can honor
trust, which in this case means rewarding the scientist. This probably
happens in many cases. For instance, many scientists were properly
rewarded by the Nazis. Governments are not reneging on the promises
made to scientists all the time. However, in the cases of maximum effort
depicted above, the government has an incentive to violate trust, like in
Kreps’ or Miller’s games. Governments have incentives in t + 1 to
violate trust (e.g., diverting the 50,000 florins promised to the piper to
other ends) and often do so.
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That also happens in democratic settings. A close example is that
of Mariano Barbacid. In 1996, the newly elected Spanish conservative
government recruited Barbacid, co-discoverer of the human oncogenes
and a well-known national figure, to manage the new state-of-the-art
Spanish National Cancer Centre (Centro Nacional de Investigaciones
Oncológicas [CNIO]). Barbacid was promised total support from the
Government and a €20 million budget a year. Yet in its third year, the
center’s budget was unexpectedly threatened with a one-third cutback.
A journalist (Sampedro 2000) commented at the time that “[t]he
budget . . . is hardly over a .1 percent of the National Health System,
but it surely represents an irresistible temptation for a manager in
distress” [our translation]. Barbacid faced the same threat again in 2001
and 2002, and commented that “we have achieved a great deal, but
without a long-term commitment from the Government, our efforts
may be wasted . . . I am rather disappointed because when I came back
[from the USA] I thought that the CNIO would change the attitude of
the government regarding science” (Bosch 2003, 1). Up to this point, the
government–scientist game in Figure 2 is identical to the one used by
Kreps or Miller. However, the capacity for taking an opportunistic
decision that changes the status quo (e.g., reneging on the promise made
to Barbacid) or, using Cox and McCubbins’ (2000) terms, the
decisiveness of a government, is limited in some political settings.9 This
limit to the governments’ decisiveness is captured by the parameter d
(costs for making decisions) in the government’s payoff.
Those constraints stem from the existence of the separation of
powers within a polity. The incumbent or his or her political party may
be the only relevant actor, for instance, and then he or she is entirely free
to violate trust. The discretion of many governments is restricted by the
existence of different sorts of constraints. Several variables have been
developed in comparative politics to account for the existence of those
constraints, such as Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier’s (2004, 24)
“constraints on the Executive,” or Tsebelis’ (1995) “veto players.” The
assumption in this study, based on this comparative literature, is that
democratic governments face more constraints on the executive (or
more veto players) than authoritarian ones.
In the case of Barbacid, public opinion acted as a veto player or a
constraint that prevented the government from reneging on the promise
made to him. The scientist resisted the first attempt to curve down the
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CNIO’s budget in 2000 when the story went to the press. He used his
public visibility and his reputation to change the planned cutback. In
2001, he granted a two-page interview with the main Spanish
newspaper, El País, which stands closer to the social-democrat
opposition party, in which he underlined the difficulties in carrying out
research in Spain and highlighted his particular problems with the
government (Barbacid 2001). As a result of the impact of those
statements in the Spanish media, the government was forced to cancel
the planned cutback.
Very decisive governments [d < (A - B)] have a higher payoff for
violating trust (A - d) than for honoring trust (B).10 Dictatorships,
where in principle there are no significant players who can veto the
ruler’s decisions, would fall into this category. In polities where the
constraints for decision making are strong enough [d > (A - B)], like
well-established democracies, the government will conversely prefer to
honor trust rather than to violate it. The existence of a government with
limited decisiveness [d > (A - B)] can paradoxically solve the problem
of trust in the model because the scientist’s choice has changed in
relation to Miller’s game: now the options are choosing minimum
effort, which gives the scientist a payoff of B, or choosing maximum
effort, which gives her the highest payoff (A).
Consequently, the initial choice of the government (concerning
bureaucratizing or not) depends on its decisiveness. When the limits to
the decisiveness are high [d > (A - B)], the government obtains a higher
payoff by choosing “discretion” over “bureaucratization” as the scientist
exerts a maximum effort. The payoff for the government in
case of “discretion” will be B. In case of “bureaucratization,” the
government obtains (B - x), which is always a lower payoff. The reason
for this payoff is that governments face a cost (-x) for using
bureaucratization: many times, they have to pay scientists for life, and
they lose flexibility to respond to external shocks demanding, for
example, fast changes in the scientific priorities or in the size and
composition of scientific units. Thus, when there is low decisiveness, the
government does not need to bureaucratize its scientists. Conversely,
when the limits for taking decisions are low for the government
(d < [A - B], a situation of high decisiveness like dictatorships), as
the scientist makes a minimum effort, the government must balance
the payoff C of “discretion” against the payoff (B - x) of
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“bureaucratization.” If the costs x are not high enough [x < (B - C)], the
government would prefer bureaucratization.
To sum up, there is a substitution effect between the separation of
powers and the bureaucratization of a public administration. In order
to induce scientists to exert a level of effort above the minimal one,
governments must either possess low decisiveness or bureaucratize state
scientists.
The game has, up to now, assumed that politicians are in a void, so
they can freely choose whether to keep discretion or to introduce
bureaucratic rules. To complete the theoretical section, a different status
quo is assumed tomake the scenariomore realistic. Imagine that, instead
of the absence of bureaucratic rules, the starting point is a situation of
high bureaucratization of scientists. If the elimination of bureaucratic
arrangements did not imply costs, the prediction of the model would
be that very decisive countries (dictatorships) would keep the level of
bureaucratization while less decisive countries (democracies) would
change toward a more flexible and discretionary approach. However,
de-bureaucratization processes also involve costs for governments since
they may imply the elimination of, for example, secure tenure or other
bureaucrats’ privileges and the reduction of the level of autonomy
enjoyed by certain administrative corps. The literature has shown
extensively how civil service reforms in many Western European
countries aimed at reducing bureaucratic autonomy have been opposed
by intense public service unions’ mobilizations (Peters and Pierre 2001,
1-11). It is thus plausible to assume that scientists, through their webs of
social interactions, will oppose certain de-bureaucratization processes
that could, for instance, threaten their tenures. The general statement by
Moe (1990, 144) on how bureaucratic organizations resist reforms that
“once a bureaucracy is created, the political world becomes a different
place because civil servants are now political actors in their own right”
could also be applied to state scientists. Following the literature on the
failure of de-bureaucratization reforms, one may therefore assume that
there are contexts where de-bureaucratization is so costly that parameter
x may have a positive sign—that is, adding to payoff B instead of
subtracting. For example, keeping bureaucratization gives the
government the support (or the lack of opposition) of key (public-sector)
unions. Government, facing a choice between a high level of
bureaucratization (which gives it a payoff of B + x) and recovering some
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degree of discretion (which gives it a payoff of B), will tend to keep the
actual levels of bureaucratization. In sum, the following hypotheses may
be derived from the simple model deployed here.
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, when governments are not very
decisive [d > (A - B)], bureaucratization of scientists is not
necessary, and if the costs of an eventual de-bureaucratization are
not high [if B > (B - X)], governments will choose a high level of
discretion in scientific policy. In this case, the outcome of the game
would be socially the most efficient: Discretion/ Maximum Effort/
Honor Trust.
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, when governments are not very
decisive [d > (A - B)], bureaucratization of scientists is not
necessary, but, if the costs of an eventual de-bureaucratization
are high [(B - X) > B], governments will keep the high level of
bureaucratization. The outcome of the game would be the second-
best one: Bureaucratization.
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, when governments are very decisive
[d < (A - B)], bureaucratization of scientists is necessary, and, if
bureaucratization costs are not high [x < (B - C)], there will be a
bureaucratization of scientists. The outcome of the game would be
the second-best one: Bureaucratization.
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, when governments are very decisive
[d < (A - B)], bureaucratization of scientists is necessary, but if
bureaucratization costs are very high (x < B - C), there will not be
bureaucratization of scientists. The outcome of the game is the
worst one: Discretion/Minimum Effort.
Table 1 summarizes the predicted scientific productivity according
to the four hypotheses. It shows scientists’ incentives under different
combinations of regime type (high decisive/dictatorship or low decisive/
democracy) and type of scientific contract (more/less bureaucratized).
An empirical contrast of these hypotheses is provided later.11
Bureaucratization, Scientific Productivity, and Dictatorships
The relationship between regime type and scientific productivity
analyzedhere is basedon a two-step argument. First, the ruler decides the
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type of scientific contract: more or less bureaucratization of scientists.
Second, the type of contract induces scientists to choose their “research
effort,” which, in turn, affects the scientific productivity of the country.
For the case of dictatorships, the first step implies that those where
the costs of bureaucratization are not very high will tend to establish
bureaucratized contracts, while in those dictatorships where costs are
high enough, rulers will tend to keep a high degree of discretion. The
second step entails that dictatorships with bureaucratized scientific
contracts will tend to have higher scientific productivity than
dictatorships with high discretion. The first step is difficult to contrast
from a quantitative point of view and, in this section, we only aim to
provide some anecdotic evidence to illuminate the workings of the
theory regarding dictatorships. A quantitative analysis of the second
step is nevertheless provided, and one can observe how, controlling for
the money spent in science, those dictatorships with high levels of
bureaucratization have higher scientific productivity.
Why Some Dictatorships Bureaucratize Their Scientists
Why is it that all dictatorships do not establish bureaucratized
contracts with scientists if they know that bureaucratization gives them
higher levels of scientific productivity? In the theoretical model, we
use parameter x to symbolize the costs that rulers must pay for
bureaucratization. Costs x may be assumed to be quite similar across
countries, but the difference between payoffs B and C may vary a lot,
depending on what political economists define as rulers’ survival
strategies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Olson 1993).
Table 1. Predicted Scientific Productivity as a Function of Regime Type and
the Level of Bureaucratization
Low Bureaucratization of
Scientists (politicians enjoy
more Discretion)
High Bureaucratization of
Scientists (politicians enjoy
less Discretion)
More decisive
governments
(dictatorships)
(1) Hypothesis 4: Minimum
effort, low Scientific
Productivity
(2) Hypothesis 3: Medium
effort, medium scientific
productivity
Less decisive
governments
(democracies)
(3) Hypothesis 1: Maximum
effort, high scientific
productivity
(4) Hypothesis 2: Medium
dffort, medium scientific
productivity
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As Bates (2001) suggests, the study of modern European absolutism
can shed light on the problems that some post-colonial African states
have experienced. Modern European absolutism contributed with
active public policies to the economic development of their societies
while African kleptocrats have not shown much interest in providing
public goods to their citizens. For Bates, with few exceptions, African
post-colonial rulers are less likely to view their economies as a strategic
resource to survive in office than modern absolutists. Contrary to Louis
XIV, who needed to develop his economy if he wanted to raise taxes to
have an army able to win wars abroad and to quell internal rebellions,
Mobutu did not need to do so because of the abundance of natural
resources and foreign aid he enjoyed.
The survival strategy of Mobutu-like rulers does not depend on the
quality of their policies, and similarly, one cannot expect that increasing
scientific productivity represents an asset for their survival in office
either. The main risks those rulers face are conspiracies, many of them
within their own rank and file (see Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier
2004). Yet tracing back to at least modern European absolutism, there
are examples of rulers who considered that their survival depended
critically on the economic (and thus scientific) development of their
countries. Two of the most known absolutist rulers were precisely the
creators of two of the first state institutions of employed and salaried
scientists: in 1666, under the advice of Colbert, Louis XIV established
the French Academy of Sciences, and in 1700, Frederick II of Prussia
put in place the Berlin Academy of Sciences (Fisher and Lundgreen
1975, 546-9). From the beginning, the scientists of the French Academy
enjoyed a remarkable level of bureaucratization and, soon afterward,
their Prussian counterparts would also achieve an important degree of
autonomy from politicians’ interferences in science.
In sum, one could classify autocrats into (1) those whose survival in
office mainly depends on the provision of public goods like overall
economic performance and, thus, they may be interested in increasing
scientific productivity; and (2) those whose survival in office mainly
depends on the provision of private goods to core constituencies, and
thus have no real interest in scientific outcomes. While the former are
mostly interested in positivelymotivating public employees (i.e., inducing
them to undertake costly asset-specific investments), the latter aremostly
interested in negatively motivating them (i.e., preventing them from
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taking certain actions). The evolution of science under Franco’s regime
(1939-75) in Spain illustrates this difference in survival strategies.
Francoism can be divided into two periods. During the first period
(1939-57), cabinets adopted a very discretionary approach to science. In
the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War (1936-9), Franco’s rule was
based on repression and on the loyalty of the ruling elite’s factions. At
the university, loyal scholars replaced dead, purged, or exiled professors
(nearly half of the academia) during the early 1940s. While the
university traditionally recruited its members through a classic career
system, the regime implemented in its first years the so-called “patriotic
examinations” that primarily evaluated the loyalty to the Francoist
ideological principles. The aim of this selection, expressed explicitly in
the University Ordering Law (1942), was ideological control.12 In a
research environment of total uncertainty, literature has shown that
scientists exerted minimum research efforts and that the result was very
low scientific productivity (Fernández-Carro 2002).
Government scientific centers were also explicitly controlled.
Although theology was the only addition to the scientific program in the
new Higher Council on Scientific Research (Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Científicas or CSIC), the latter exerted ideological
control over scientists along the ideals of National Catholicism and of
a vindicated imperial scientific tradition.13 CSIC was also intended to
help the development of a self-sufficient national industry, imitating
the Nazi German autarchic model. “Unshakeable loyalty” to the
New State’s principles was a requisite to become a CSIC scientist, and
researchers were not under civil service status. Except for those
committed to the regime from the very beginning, the great bulk of
scientists enjoyed limited opportunities to direct research projects,
compete for senior positions, or manage laboratories (see Santesmases
1998, 323). Consequently, again, productivity was extremely low. As
González Blasco and Jiménez Blanco (1979, 100) remark, Spain has not
yet had a Nobel laureate in science since the CSIC was established.14
Science in early Francoism suffered scientists’ mistrust of the
government. As far as prizes and positions were not related to
performance, the incentives for the remaining scientists were low and
the best response was to limit efforts to a minimum.
Franco’s survival strategy changed during the 1950s. After the
struggling economy had led to serious riots and demonstrations in
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several cities, Franco shifted his policy priorities toward the provision of
public goods. He appointed several ministers known as the Technocrats,
uncommitted to the fascist ideology and who launched market-oriented
economic reforms. They began the so-called Desarrollismo, a period of
fast economic development. The reforms included a transformation of
the public service tomake itmore professional and career oriented.More
importantly for this study, during the 1960s, state scientists’ careers
came under the Civil Service Act and became lifelong: Spanish scientists,
thus, became bureaucratized and more autonomous from politicians’
interferences. Did scientists move from minimum to medium levels of
effort as a result of their bureaucratization? It is difficult to assess this,
given the lack of reliable bibliometrical accounts on the period, but the
Science Citations Index database (SCI) records a sharp increase in
scientific productivity at the end of the dictatorship: 831 publications in
Science and Social Sciences in 1973 and only nine publications in the
period until 1972.15
Bureaucratization and Scientific Productivity in Dictatorships
The historical evolution of Franco’s rule illustrates how dictators,
when their survival depends on fostering economic development, choose
to tie their hands in the management of scientists through what has here
been called bureaucratization. If the predictions of themodel are correct,
one should observe a higher scientific productivity in those dictatorships
that have bureaucratized their scientists than in those that have not.
One of the best proxies for the scientific productivity of a country
(SPC) is its Science Production, measured as the number of publications
recorded in the SCI.16 As a country’s total science production depends,
to start with, on its number of inhabitants, we must divide the Science
Production of each country by the size of the population. There is
consensus in the literature that the degree of economic development of
a country is the most important determinant of its scientific productivity
(Cole and Phelan 1999, 14; Price 1963). Given this, the relevant question
that should be answered nowadays according to Cole and Phelan (1999,
15) concerns not the degree of impact of gross domestic product (GDP)
over scientific productivity, but why there are countries—like Israel—
which produce far more science than one should expect based on its
wealth, while others—like Italy—produce far fewer than its GDP would
indicate. We aim to address this question here.
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In addition, the low number of observations in our regressions
both for dictatorships and democracies—and therefore the reduction
in degrees of freedom that comes from including many control
variables—means that there is an additional reason to introduce
countries’ degree of development within our dependent variable.17
Consequently, we define the SPC as science production by the gross
domestic product of that country.18 SPC is thus an artificial construct
aimed at measuring the capacity of a country to produce science
independently of its population and wealth. SPC is the capacity a
country has to produce science controlling for its population and
level of development. Our theoretical model proposes that this
scientific capacity may be affected by changes in scientists’ type of
contracts.
As a proxy for the bureaucratization of scientists in dictatorships,
we use the Weberianess Score developed by Evans and Rauch (1999),
which is the most comprehensive attempt to build up a quantitative
index of bureaucratization for non-Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The Weberianess
Score and the indexes of bureaucratization we use for democracies
below are similar as they all measure the extent of nonpolitical
recruitment/promotion/firing of public employees. Therefore, they are
coherent with our model because they try to capture the autonomy of
civil servants in relation to politicians. However, we need to emphasize
that those indicators are just proxies because their authors do not
restrict the analysis to state scientists, but they study general public
service organization. We assume that public researchers and academics
in public universities work under similar recruitment and incentives
systems as their colleagues in other sectors of the public administration
while also recognizing that there might be exceptions to this
assumption.19 The Weberianess Score—a continuous variable that
ranges from 0 to 14—measures the degree of bureaucratization for 35
developing countries around 1992. Because in this section we are
interested in dictatorships, we have removed the democracies from the
sample.20
Model 1 in Table 2 shows the effect of bureaucratization on the SPC
without any control variables. Despite the relative low number of
observations (28), bureaucratization exerts a positive significant impact
on the quality of science. Therefore, it seems that the type of contract
1026 Politics & Policy Vol. 36 No. 6
between government and scientists, bureaucratized or not, makes a
difference in the SPC (the science production of the country according
to its population and economic development).
In the literature on developed countries (see Cole and Phelan 1999),
scientific productivity has been found to be dependent also on the
country’s expenditure on research and development (R&D) and on its
human capital stocks. We use control variables for those factors in our
posterior analysis of democracies. The unavailability of reliable data for
dictatorships on those variables prevents us from properly controlling
for these alternative factors. The existence of some consistent data on
R&D expenditure for some countries and some years permits the tests
deployed in models 2 and 3, which control for the money invested in
science. We take data on Expenditure in Science from the World
Development Indicators, which collects the percentage of the GDP
devoted to scientific activities.
Two major problems question the validity of models controlling
for R&D expenditure (models 2 and 3). The number of observations
is extremely low in both cases (9 and 16, respectively) for extracting
any relevant conclusion. Also, the independent variables in models 2
and 3 do not show consistent behavior: while the significant impact of
Table 2. Determinants of Scientific Productivity in Dictatorships
Model
Variables 1 2 3
Constant 1.935 -6.275 7.438**
(2.540) (4.899) (2.701)
Bureaucratization (Weberianess Scale) .762** 1.593* -.472
(.330) (.739) (.366)
Expenditure in science 1990 1.459
(4.23)
Expenditure in science 2000 7.639***
(1.587)
R2 .170 .725 .675
N 28 9 16
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed).
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is Scientific Productivity of Countries (by Real Constant GDP) in
2000.
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bureaucratization eliminates the significance of Expenditure in Science
in 1990 (model 2), the effect of the Expenditure in Science in 2000 makes
bureaucratization insignificant in model 3. This behavior points to
problems of multicollinearity, confirmed by the high bivariate
correlations existing between bureaucratization and the available
measures of expenditure (.7 and .8, respectively). Further observations
beyond the scope of this article would be needed to properly control the
effect of expenditure and further theoretical exploration on the possible
causal relationships between bureaucratization and Expenditure in
Science would also be required.21 In sum, despite the limitations of these
data, it seems that our independent variable—bureaucratization—
exerts a positive effect on the scientific productivity of dictatorships.
(Figure 3).
Figure 3.
Bureaucratic Autonomy and Scientific Productivity in Dictatorships
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Bureaucratization, Scientific Productivity, and Democracies
Similar to dictatorships, there are two steps to be empirically
contrasted for democracies: the decision of governments over scientists’
type of contract and whether democracies with lower bureaucratization
perform better in terms of scientific productivity than democracies
with high bureaucratization. Again, the first step is difficult to test
quantitatively and, here, we only provide some illustrative examples of
how certain democracies that had inherited highly bureaucratized
scientific contracts decided to de-bureaucratize their science system.
Akin to the previous analysis of dictatorships, a quantitative study of
the second step is given and one can observe how, contrary to what
happened with dictatorships, controlling for countries’ money spent in
science and levels of human capital, democracies with lower levels of
bureaucratization exhibit higher scientific productivity.
Why Some Democracies Debureaucratize Their Scientists
We expect that democratic governments do not need
bureaucratization to prevent scientists from undertaking “minimum
efforts” in research. However, if the status quo in a country is
bureaucratization, democratic rulers will have to balance the potential
benefits of de-bureaucratization (the difference between a maximum
and medium research effort under bureaucratization) with its potential
costs: the opposition of some scientists who enjoy secure tenure and
other privileges of bureaucratic autonomy.
In most countries, scientists—like other civil servants—have shown
strong resistance against any attempt of de-bureaucratizing them
(Peters and Pierre 2001, 1-11). A large body of evidence (see Pierre 2001,
133) shows how opposition platforms have been created against many
proposals for changing the status quo of scientists, university professors,
or other civil servants. Yet in other contexts, the costs of reducing
bureaucratization have been lower for different reasons. For instance,
voters may not support an overprotected and less efficient bureaucracy
with some power to change the decisions taken by a democratically
elected government. That could be the case, at least partially, of the
United Kingdom, which de-bureaucratized its science through pseudo-
privatizations of public laboratories (Boden et al. 2004). Even though
the profile of protests was low and some scientists welcomed the
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opportunity to compete for better salaries, there was also notable
resistance to change in the United Kingdom coming from scientists and
civil society movements who feared a loss of independence in public
advice by state scientists.
Bureaucratization and Scientific Productivity in Democracies
We move now to the second step: the impact of bureaucratization
over scientific productivity in democracies. Tables 3 and 4 show the
results obtained by two different proxies for bureaucratization in
democracies: closed-ness and bureaucratization. Results are similar in
both cases. We use the same dependent variable as for dictatorships—
the SPC—and we add variables to control for expenditure in R&D and
the level of human capital.
In Table 3, the proxy for bureaucratization is the variable developed
by Schnapp (2000) that we re-term Closed-ness.22 A continuous variable
that ranges from 1 to 6, Closed-ness portrays the career systems of 17
European countries in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and aims to capture
the degree of autonomy of civil servants in relation to politicians. Open
civil service systems are those where politicians enjoy more discretion
for managing public employees; closed civil service systems are those
where public employees are “closed” to politicians’ interferences. A
Table 3. Determinants of Scientific Productivity in Democracies (I)
Model
Variables 1 2 3
Constant 59.396*** 38.622*** 34.769*
(6.144) (11.778) (16.827)
Bureaucratization (Closed-ness) -5.554*** -3.804** -3.562*
(1.573) (1.679) (1.883)
Expenditure in Science 2000 7.516** 7.487*
(3.748) (3.874)
% of Population with Tertiary Education .194
(.585)
R2 .454 .576 .579
N 17 17 17
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed).
Unstandardized regression coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is Scientific Productivity of Countries in 2000.
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paradigmatic example of the latter would be the organizational
structures based on autonomous administrative corps like those existing
in France or Spain. Examples of the former would be the Netherlands,
Sweden, or the United Kingdom.
Model 1 in Table 3 presents the results without any control
variables and bureaucratization exhibits a highly significant effect on
scientific productivity. As predicted in the theoretical part, this effect is
negative: the more bureaucratization in democracies, the less scientific
output. The availability of reliable data for democracies allows us to
introduce more sophisticated controls here. In models 2 and 3, we
include the two independent variables most extensively analyzed by the
literature and which show a significant and positive effect on scientific
productivity when we do not include bureaucratization in the equation.
Expenditure in Science for the year 2000 (again from the World
Development Indicators) controls for the share of GDP devoted to
science, and the Percentage of Population with Tertiary Education is
the available human capital variable that correlates the most with
science production. Contrary to what happened in dictatorships, the
bivariate correlations among the independent variables are relatively
low (in all cases < .6) and do not indicate any serious problem of
multicollinearity.
Table 4. Determinants of Scientific Productivity in Democracies (II)
Model
Variables 1 2 3
Constant 15.228** 7.881 7.488
(6.168) (6.772) (7.798)
Bureaucratization (inverse of OECD
Debureaucratization)
-1.864*** -1.538*** -1.519***
(.501) (.497) (.537)
Expenditure in Science 2000 6.217** 6.070*
(2.947) (3.299)
% of Population with Tertiary
Education
.055
(.915)
R2 .339 .435 .435
N 29 29 29
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed).
Unstandardized regression coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is Scientific Productivity of Countries in 2000.
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The inclusion of Expenditure in Science in model 2 reduces the
significance of bureaucratization, but the latter keeps an independent
and significant (at 5 percent) effect on scientific output. Model 2 can be
interpreted in this way: an increment of 1 point in the 1-6 scale of
bureaucratization (Closed-ness) decreases by 3.8 the number of scientific
papers by unit of a country’s wealth in 2000. To complete the picture,
model 3 includes a second control variable: a proxy for human capital.
With it, bureaucratization and expenditure in science present slightly
lower coefficients to those in model 2 and have lost some significance
(falling from 5 percent to 10 percent). Nevertheless, both keep their
significant effect (negative in the case of bureaucratization and positive
in the case of expenditure), which is especially remarkable given the
drop in the degrees of freedom in an analysis with only 17 observations.
One of the most remarkable findings is that the percentage of
population with tertiary education—which showed a strong significant
effect on scientific productivity in previous studies, and which also
exhibits here a significant impact when it is included as the only
independent variable—loses completely its statistical significance when
expenditure and bureaucratization are included. While no definite
conclusions may be extracted from a fairly small-N study, it seems that
the bureaucratic nature of scientists’ contracts may affect the scientific
outputs of a country even more than the variables traditionally explored
by the literature.
These results are more solidly confirmed in the analysis shown in
Table 4 where the proxy for bureaucratization is a combination of two
indexes of human resources practices in public administrations created
by the OECD (2004, 17). They capture the debureaucratization of public
administrations: to what extent OECD countries have substituted new
public management practices (e.g., more flexibility and more discretion
for political managers) for traditional bureaucratic contracts (e.g., more
stability and rigidity in contracts and more predictability in civil
servants’ careers).23
In general, the results in Table 4 are very similar to those in
Table 3. The major difference is that the proxy for bureaucratization
of scientists used here remains highly significant, at 1 percent, even
when the two control variables are included (model 3).24 As in Table 3,
the inclusion of bureaucratization diminishes the explanatory power of
two variables traditionally associated with scientific productivity. First,
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to an even greater extent than in Table 3, bureaucratization decreases
the importance of the money spent in science (Expenditure in Science
2000) for explaining scientific productivity. Second, it completely
eliminates the effect of the human capital variable most highly
correlated with scientific productivity (Percentage of Population with
Tertiary Education). In the light of the small-N empirical analyses
shown in this section, we cannot claim that our hypotheses are fully
contrasted for either democracies or dictatorships. Nevertheless, they
point out an interesting and so far unexplored relationship, which
should encourage future research on both state employees in general
and scientists in particular: the opposite effect of bureaucratization on
the efficiency of public employees depending on the political regime.
(Figure 4).
Figure 4.
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Conclusions
This article has analyzed the relationship between political regime,
type of administration, and policy outcomes—in particular, science
policy outcomes that, unlike many other policy outcomes, allow
certain cross-country comparisons given the existence of international
data sets such as the SCI. This study complements the work of
Fernández-Carro (2002), focusing on the relationship between regime-
type and science policy outcomes that shows theoretically and
empirically how democracies provide a better environment for
scientific productivity. The study also complements Lapuente Gine’s
(2006) analysis of the relationships between political regime and type
of administration. He develops and tests a game-theoretic explanation
for why regimes with high decisiveness (e.g., dictatorships), when
interested in providing public goods, tend to bureaucratize their public
administrations.
As Moe (1997) points out, formal models applied to understanding
bureaucratic structures tend to be too complex, and their implications
threaten to be so hedged about by qualifications and conditions that
they are either trivial or difficult to interpret or apply. On the contrary,
the model presented here is simple, with propositions not dependent
on complex qualifications and conditions. The propositions are easy
to interpret and test, as shown in the empirical section of the paper.
Despite being straightforward, they are not trivial, as they contain
two—to a certain extent—counter-intuitive findings. First, when rulers
are interested in producing science, the more powerful a ruler is, the
more he or she will tend to bureaucratize his or her administration.
Second, bureaucratization produces an opposite effect on policy
outcomes depending on the political regime—it increases the efficiency
of policies in dictatorships and decreases the efficiency in democracies.
Future research would expand the scope of the empirical analysis by
including larger data sets as well as paying attention to within-country
differences. For example, the United States can be seen as a natural
experiment for analyzing the effects of bureaucratization of scientists in
democracies, as there is a system of intramural laboratories in which
employees are generally civil servants and another of extramural
research in which employees are generally not civil servants. At the
theoretical level, future inquiry should tackle the within-democracies
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and within-autocracies differences that one may suspect exist in
governments’ level of “decisiveness” regarding scientists. Further
developments of the theoretical model should also account for the
potentially important role that “intermediate agents,” such as Research
or University Councils, may play. It is straightforward to see their
relevance, but it is difficult to include their systematic impact within a
model like the one used here—especially taking into account the
problems of finding reliable data on those intermediate agents and their
composition (that is, to what extent their preferences differ from those
of politicians and scientists).
The bottom line is that there are differences in the scientific
productivity between dictatorships and democracies. There are also
differences within political regimes. This work contends that those
differences are due to the effect of an intermediate variable, the
bureaucratization of scientific contracts. Through bureaucratization,
dictatorships reduce the high uncertainties and time inconsistencies
inherent to the relationship between powerful principals (governments)
and agents that need to make costly asset-specific investments
(scientists). Bureaucratization is a second-best solution to prevent the
“minimum research effort” expected in noncredible environments like
dictatorships. It also precludes the “maximum research effort” expected
in more credible environments like democracies. In other words,
bureaucracy makes science more productive when governments are not
reliable, but it makes science less productive when governments are
trustworthy.
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1 Except where cited, this study concerns nonappropriable science intended for publication, both
basic and applied. Following David (1998), we separate it from appropriable knowledge that can
become a patent or help to develop an industrial process for a firm, for instance. Most of
nonappropriable science is paid by the government, carried out in public organizations, and
published. Although tightly linked, nonproprietary and proprietary sciences are different.
Appropriable knowledge allows a different incentive system for agents—e.g., an easier one based
on result sharing (Fernández-Carro 2007).
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2We follow the criticism of those assumptions by the Interest Theory literature in sociology of
science. See, for instance, Barnes and Dolby (1970), Mulkay (1991), or Barnes (1985). We also
assume self-interested behavior by politicians. Similar to Braun (1993, 139), it is assumed here that
it is not economic efficiency that guides the actions of politicians in their relations with scientists.
Both authoritarian and democratic rulers are driven by what Moe (1990) defines as political
efficiency: they are interested in remaining in office.
3 This contractualist perspective joins the concerns of science policy studies with those of the
so-called “social contract of science,” the tacit promise of science “to deliver goods to society in
return for its patronage with no string attached” (Rip 1990, our emphasis, cited in Guston 1996).
4 Other studies focus on intermediate agencies, such as research councils (Braun 1993, 139) or in
public or private laboratories as agents.
5 Van der Meulen (1998) suggests that repeated games could provide stability to the government-
scientists relationship, along with other intermediate institutions, but he finds that a pure game is
unstable. As suggested by political economists, ultimately no clear predictions may be derived from
repeated games, because of the implications of the Folk Theorem (see Falaschetti 2002, 163). We
follow these authors in considering that, at least initially, one-shot games are the best way of
tackling the game-theoretic interaction among actors. Future extensions of the game developed
here should allow for the possibility of repetition as well as the introduction of other potentially
relevant actors.
6 The essence of the game is a problem of information asymmetry for both actors. Employees do
not know what managers will do and managers can never be sure what employees’ marginal cost
of effort functions looks like. Employees are systematically trying to protect that informational
advantage, but, if they trust the manager and work hard, the latter may discover the employees’
real marginal cost of effort functions (Falaschetti 2002, 163).
7 Just two months after the Nazi seizure of power, Hitler issued the “Law of the Restoration of
Career Civil Service” (April 7, 1933) through which Nazi officials took over the reins of scientists’
tenure, promotion, and incentives. As a consequence, many unreliable scientists were soon
dismissed (Beyerchen 1977, 12-14, 43-7; our emphasis). The law created uncertainty, especially to
those most directly affected by it (“those of ‘non-Aryan’ descent”), but also to any scientist, since it
became discretional and opened up for interpretation on the second motive for dismissal: “those
whose previous political activities did not guarantee that they would at all times unreservedly serve the
new state.”
8Wintrobe and Breton (1986, 909; our emphasis) show how, even in the most totalitarian
dictatorships, “superiors and subordinates, in effect, trade with each other.” Superiors seek to buy
informal services–services that cannot be codified in formal documents—and, in exchange, they
offer informal payments, such as rapid promotions.
9 For Cox and McCubbins (2000), one of the main trade-offs political systems face is between
decisiveness, the capacity to take political decisions, which increase with the degree of
concentration of powers, and resoluteness, the capacity to show a long-term commitment to the
policies enacted in a concrete moment, which decrease with the degree of concentration of powers.
10 Following Kydland and Prescott, it does not mean that governments are always going to renege
on their promises and it is important to remark here that, “the reason that they [policy-makers]
should not have discretion is not that they are stupid or evil but, rather, that discretion implies
selecting the decision which is best, given the current situation” (1977, 487).
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11 This paper focuses on the differences between authoritarian regimes and democracies, but it is
plausible to believe that there are also notable within-democracies and within-autocracies
differences in the relevant variable here—i.e., “decisiveness” regarding scientists. Future research
should address up to which extent within-regime differences may affect, first, bureaucratization
levels among scientists and, second, overall levels of scientific productivity. This research will
probably require both a more refined theoretical model as well as more encompassing data sets
than the existing ones.
12 This Law put the university under the National-Catholic ideals and the Falange’s mainly fascist
principles: “Third Article. The University, inspired by the Catholic sense, inherent to the Spanish
academic tradition, will bring its teaching to the catholic moral and dogma, and to the rules of the
current cannon Law. Fourth Article. The Spanish University, in harmony with the ideals of the
National-Syndicalist State, will adjust its teaching and its educational tasks to the Movement
programmatic concerns.” From University Ordering Law: Ley de 29 de julio de 1943 sobre
Ordenación de la Universidad española, Boletín Oficial del Estado 212, July 31, 1943, pages 7.406
to 7.431; our emphasis. The Movement (Movimiento or Movimiento Nacional) dubs the ruling
coalition.
13 In a speech to the general council of the CSIC, General Franco stated explicitly its mission: “The
Spanish regime does not hinder or hamper the legitimate scientific freedom but wants and demands
that the research activity subordinates and adjust itself to the spiritual and material needs of the
country . . . This is all about our yearning for empire” (CSICAnnual Report 1946-47, 1948). See also
Santesmases and Muñoz (1993, 156).
14 This is not formally true, since the Spanish-born Severo Ochoa won the Nobel in 1959.
Nevertheless, Ochoa’s research cannot be considered an example of “Francoist science” but, quite
the opposite, of the problems of Franco’s discretionary science, since Ochoa left Spain as a result
of Franco’s rebellion in 1936. He made his academic career in the United States and only
returned permanently when the dictatorship was over. He had begun his career under the
democratic Second Republic. Moreover, he was a pupil and a protegée of the last Prime Minister
of the Republic’s Government and, although he was never directly involved in politics, both his
life and his career would have been in danger for this reason in the case he had returned to the
country.
15 The reliability of the SCI database is built upon the way it selects the covered journals, by the
number of its articles’ citations. Following Bradford’s Law, most of the cited literature is published
in a very few journals: SCI weekly selects those whose articles are cited often. Journal selection is,
thus, in some way automatic. Articles published in these journals are then indexed. Mutual
citations are eventually used to evaluate the relative importance of the articles themselves, the
journals, their authors, the institutions they work for, and the countries these institutions are in.
Although the database started working early in the 1960s, the first complete analyses of countries
began in the 1980s. These analyses mainly consist in the counting of the number of papers
published in the SCI covered journals, the country’s production for a certain year. This rough
number strongly depends on the country’s size and wealth, and normalization is needed to compare
among countries.
16 Cole and Phelan (1999) discuss why SCI is the best feasible alternative to use as a proxy to a
country’s science production. It could be argued that some of SCI publications do not come from
state scientists but from private sector scientists to whom, obviously, our theoretical predictions do
not apply. However, private firms publish very basic science papers—ranging from almost none in
developing countries to 6-9 percent in developed ones (Hicks 1995).
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17 The results do not change if we use a country’s science production divided by population as a
dependent variable and the level of economic development as an independent variable. It simply
decreases the degrees of freedom in our already small-N statistical analysis. For that reason, we
prefer to include GDP in our dependent variable following the suggestion of several scholars in the
field (e.g., Cole and Phelan 1999).
18 Equivalent to dividing Scientific Productivity (by population) by per capita GDP because
“population” is dividing both in the numerator and in the denominator. Real GDP figure is taken
from the Penn World Tables (constant 1996 international $).
19 Public research centers and universities often have personnel policies different from those of the
general public administration. There are no data sets devoted to public bureaucracies in the field of
science. More importantly, when a Civil Service Act exists within a country, in general, scientists
are covered by it. That is the case in most continental European countries where state scientists
are legally treated like regular civil servants. We therefore consider that the indexes of civil service
level of bureaucratization are the best feasible alternative proxies for scientists’ level of
bureaucratization.
20 Evans and Rauch’s original list includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Congo
Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala,
Haiti, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malagasy Republic, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay. We removed those countries that had a score lower
than 2.5 as an average of Freedom House’s freedom ratings between 1972 and 1992. The lack of
information in some of the independent variables limits the final number in the analysis to about
25 countries.
21 Rauch’s (1995) findings may be useful in this sense. He shows how higher levels of
bureaucratization—measured through the adoption of Civil Service Commissions in U.S.
municipalities during the Progressive Era (1900-20)—led to the allocation of higher percentages of
local budgets to long-term investments such as infrastructure and lower to short-term policies.
Something similar could be happening in the cases analyzed here (that is, more bureaucratized
states make more long-term investments such as expenditure in research), but further research is
needed to falsify it.
22 Schnapp calls this variable openness using data from Auer, Demmke, and Polet (1996). Since we
inverted its values, we renamed it Closed-ness to facilitate the comparison with the other empirical
analyses.
23 The two OECD indexes are individualisation and delegation. “Individualisation is
measured by the degree to which the management rules and practices vary according to the
individuals and less according to the group” (OECD 2004, 17) and focuses on the way in
which incentives are applied to public servants. “Delegation” levels are measured by where
decision making power is located, from the central bodies (normally outside the control
of politicians) to line departments and lower administrative levels (where elected politicians
enjoy more discretion). We combined both indexes for simplicity, but the results are almost
identical if we use any of them as proxies for bureaucratization since they are highly
correlated.
24 This is mostly due to the fact that the number of observations has increased from 17 (Table 3) to
29 (Table 4).
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